After the Shootings in Canada: between the Question of Citizens` Right of Privacy and National S

Will Canadian citizens sacrifice their right of privacy in the name of better national security? Can surveillance operate as a positive for society impact? What position should both civilians and authorities undertake so to prevent a potential collision in present welfare apparatus?

Video inside Canada Parliament during shooting in October 2014/ CNN

The serial of tragic events which occurred in Quebec and Ottawa at the end of October 2014 will not be easily forgotten by the Canadian society. First, a hit and run in the French province ended with the death of 53 years old Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent. Second, the incident was followed by another one in the capital of Canada, where the strike of a masked gunman on National War Memorial left Corporal Nathan Cirillo (24) lifeless. This attack set was supported by 50 shots inside the Centre Block of Parliament Buildings and leaded to the death of the gunman, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who was killed by one of the House of Commons sergeant-at-arms.

According to the national security agencies, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau (32) was a Canadian citizen with origin the city of Laval, Quebec. The young man has not having any contact with his family for the last five years. It was known by the officials that after his release from prison in 2012, the person was using as a permanent residence the Masjid Al-Salaam mosque in Vancouver. After the unforeseen circumstances and despite his death, Zehaf-Bibeau has excluded from the mosque due to his conduct which was publicly recognized as unacceptable towards the community code of Islamic Society of British Columbia region.

The violent invasion against Canadian authorities created new debate in national government regarding the level of public security in the country. Steven Blaney, State`s Minister of Public Safety suggests an enlargement the executive powers of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (GRC) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (SCRS) agencies so to prevent further crimes against the nation. There is already an existing commitment by the Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, to strengthen the working conditions in SCRS but after recent attacks the process of improvement the Canadian police and military forces is up for discussion. One solution is future Parliament inputs to be monitored by GRC but such decision has not been approved officially by the President of the House of Commons yet.

The Difficult Task to Define and Protect Privacy in Surveillance World

If we assume there is a real potential the Canadian security services to be authorized by the government to take further control over national affairs this act will be mainly expressed by more surveillance to be performed towards social activities. How this change will reflect on privacy?

Finding an answer to question of such merit is not an easy task due to the fact that despite considerable progress in information and communication technologies (ICTs) which occurred over the last thirty years and which allowed many national institutions to carry out surveillance upon its citizens, the concept of privacy still remains unclear. According to Taylor (2002), electronic monitoring has two sides: it can operate to limit civil rights through inspiring a social cohesion or it can function as a key tool towards crime prevention.

To achieve an approval from citizens regarding future surveillance expansion, the Canadian governors have first of all to deal with the general problem of defining privacy as a legal term. An adequate and beneficial reaction from social part will be reached only through such institutional act of legislative responsibility.

One reason the theory of public privacy not to be completely explained until now is because the notion was never being an issue before the advent of modern technologies. To manage the challenge of keeping the present Canadian social-welfare proportionality, it will be better for agencies to comprehend privacy as a right of citizens to establish connections with other individuals and to let them remain the right of personal information instead to limit the concept by describing it simply as a form of personal inner circle of expression.

Canada has to indicate there will be no interference towards the social privacy even if Parliament inputs will be monitored by GRC. The law must be sufficiently clear in its terms and to give citizens enough sufficient demonstration as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the police is empowered to resort to surveillance. A lack of such mandatory juridical regulation concerning the procedures can be recognized as a great institutional weakness.

Three Potential Surveillance Scenarios to be Taken Under Consideration

Difficulties regarding public privacy and doubts regarding positive impact of surveillance over states increase the pressure towards institutions and governments. Contemporary global considerations in relation to terrorist attacks do not ease the monitoring effectiveness and do not facilitate the process of admission its potential as a source of learning and receiving better data information. As a matter of fact, more active surveillance does not mean better quality service due to as many citizens are daily monitored and recorded, as greater amount of data starts to exist.

According to Gilbert (2007), future surveillance progress depends on the balance of controlling citizens. There is already an existence of tree models related to subject which can briefly explain the importance of such equilibrium. The first condition is named Big Brother scenario. Despite it initially refers to George Orwell`s post-war perspective of technologies and their capacity to assure giant databases in favour to centralised governments, this perception of control over society is still valid nowadays. In this case, both connection and disconnection ICTs stay fragmented and beyond central control. This variant of ground level surveillance has been called sousveillance and it concerns welfare states that do not have and cannot provide transparency so to bring monitoring under control.

The second term or Big Mess model is relevant to a situation where connection exercises control over state and both processing and disconnection are uncoordinated, except in certain specialised subsectors such as defence. Here, citizens and organizations cannot disconnect and even those organizations with legitimate demands for processing find it difficult to gather the information they need. There is also a subsistence of huge data amount involved, poor navigation aids and trouble in finding tracking links. As a result, public sphere does not have confidence in national services and it remains harder for society to gain benefits of e-services (e.g. health, governmental and private sector).

Finally, in Little Sister case, the disconnection technologies are widely utilized in a coordinated manner. Personal data is constantly encrypted and managed in a secure way so the regulated connectivity does not threaten it. This creates Little Sisters components who independently watch over only a fragment of a person`s identity but when collaborate with each other can display all. Lots of Little Sisters might be better than one Big Brother or chaotic Big Mess option.

Trusting the Digital Opportunities

The legislative proposal which will give more power to defence services in Canada is already in its term but part in decision if law to be ratified or not depends on citizens` opinion. At this point, public trust in surveillance and its digital opportunities can straighten the relations between legitimacy of the Canadian democratic state and the governmental potential to carry out its duties.

Public faith in institutions is a delicate manner: it develops over time but can be lost quickly. To prevent future critics against both governance and security agencies, the right of social privacy should be tolerated. If authorities allow the existence of surveillance to abuse individuals, this condition will inevitably lead to failure in state`s affairs. It might take years, even for an effective governance like the Canadian one, to establish civil confidence towards the positive impact of monitoring technologies but with administrative stability and strong sense of responsibility from GRC` and SCRS` side, this anti-crime strategy can turn out to be beneficial.

References

Arnould, F. ‘’Zehaf-Bibeau avait été expulsé d’une mosquée’’. Ici Radio-Canada. October 2014, <http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/societe/2014/10/25/001-tireur-parlement-zehaf-bibeau-expulsion-mosquee.shtml>, (28.10.2014)

Goodsell, D. ‘’Ottawa shooting: A look back at how the week unfolded’’. CBC News. October 2014, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa-shooting-a-look-back-at-how-the-week-unfolded-1.2811614> (28.10.2014)

Gilbert, Nigel. (2007), Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance: Challenges of Technological Change. London: The Royal Academy of Engineering.

Taylor, Nick. (2002), ‘‘State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy’’ in Surveillance & Society, 1 (1): 66-85.

Thibault, D. ‘’Le Canada ne restera pas assis face à la menace islamiste, dit le ministre Blaney’’. Ici Radio-Canada. October 2014, <http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/politique/2014/10/27/001-projet-loi-plus-de-pouvoir-grc-scrs.shtml> (28.10.2014)

#conflict #politics